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Abstract: Autonomous systems are being increasingly used in many areas. A significant
example is unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), regularly being called upon to perform tasks in
the military theatre. Autonomous systems can work alone or be called upon to work colla-
boratively towards common mission objectives. In this case it will be necessary to ensure that
the decisions enable the progression of the platform objectives and also the overall mission
objectives.
The motivation behind the work presented in this paper is the need to be able to predict the
failure probability of missions performed by a number of autonomous systems working toge-
ther. Such mission prognoses can assist the mission planning process in autonomous systems
when conditions change, with reconfiguration taking place if the probability of mission failure
becomes unacceptably high.
In a multiplatform phased mission a number of platforms perform their own phased mission
that contributes to an overall mission objective. Presented in this paper is a methodology
for calculating the phase failure probabilities of a multiplatform phased mission. These
probabilities are then used to find the total mission failure probability. Prior to the mission the
failure probabilities are used to decide if the original mission structure is acceptable. Once
underway, failure probabilities, updated as circumstances change, are used to decide whether
a mission should continue. Circumstances can change owing to failures on a platform, chan-
ging environmental conditions (weather), or the occurrence of unforeseen external events
(emerging threats). This diagnostics information should be used to ensure that the updated
failure probabilities calculated take into account the most up-to-date system information
possible. Since the speed of decision making and the accuracy of the information used are
essential, binary decision diagrams (BDDs) are utilized to form the basis of a fast, accurate
quantification process.
Keywords: phased mission analysis, reliability-based prognostics, mission planning, binary
decision diagrams (BDDs)
1 INTRODUCTION
Many systems perform missions consisting of several
phases. Such phased missions are characterized by
sequential, ordered phases, each of which must be
completed in order for the mission to be successful.
The requirements placed upon the system differ from
phase to phase. As such, the causes of failure for each
mission phase also differ. A typical example of a
phased mission is an aircraft flight: taxi to runway,
take-off, climb, cruise, descend, land, taxi to term-
inal. Platforms in the military arena also perform
phased missions. The consequences of failure for
these phased missions can be high and for this rea-
son it is important to be able to analyse the reliability
of these missions accurately. A number of methods
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are available that can be used to produce the failure
probabilities of such missions. Examples are fault
tree analysis [1], cause–consequence analysis [2],
binary decision diagrams [3, 4], Markov analysis [5],
simulation [6], Petri nets [7], or a combination of
approaches, e.g. combinatorial and Markov approa-
ches, as in reference [8].
For some mission types, such as search and rescue,
individual platforms are required to work collabora-
tively in order to achieve an overall mission objective.
The move towards network-enabled capability (NEC)
or network centric warfare (NCW) in military envir-
onments is also an illustration of this. Such multi-
platform phased missions are characterized by the
fact that individual platforms will each perform their
own phased missions, within which certain tasks will
contribute to the overall mission goal. In these multi-
platform phased missions there is no requirement for
sequential ordering of tasks, which may be carried out
in parallel by different platforms, despite the sequen-
tial phases that must be performed by the single
platforms. Individual platforms may not be required
to be successful throughout all of the phases of their
own mission in order for the mission objective to be
accomplished. Successful operation up to the end of
the last of their phases that contributes to the mission
objective may be sufficient.
Autonomous systems that are required to operate
as part of multiplatform phased missions must, by
definition, make decisions about the actions that they
are to perform, without human input. In systems
such as these the reliability of the phased missions
could form part of a decision-making strategy [9]. In
other systems a measure of the reliability of a multi-
platform phased mission could inform human deci-
sion makers as to how a mission should proceed. In
either case there are two key points in a mission
when a measure of the failure probability of a multi-
platform phased mission system could be used. The
first of these is before the mission begins. This would
provide some information that could be used to assist
in deciding whether or not the mission should begin
in the proposed configuration. The second point is
during the mission, when diagnostics information
informs of a change in state of some contributor to
the mission, and a new measure of the failure prob-
ability would help decide how the mission should
continue.
This paper presents a novel methodology for the
reliability analysis of multiplatform phased mission
systems. The methodology assumes that the plat-
forms performing the mission are non-repairable.
Methods of using diagnostic data (which report the
status of components, functions, or subsystems of
the various platforms) in calculating the failure
probability of the system while the mission is in
progress are detailed, and a simple example is used to
demonstrate the methodology.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section a methodology that is used for
single platform phased mission analysis is outlined.
This method is later extended to form part of
the multi-platform phased mission methodology.
Also presented is a binary decision diagram (BDD)
representation that will also be used within the
methodology.
2.1 Single-platform phased mission analysis
A method of calculating mission failure probabilities
for a single-platform phased mission is presented in
reference [3]. For a platform, p, the probability of
mission failure, Qp,i, in each of the mission phases, i,
is added to give the total probability of failure for the
platform mission, Qp,MISS. The probability of mission
failure in each of the mission phases takes into
account the success of previous mission phases.
The logical expressions for failure conditions being
met in each of the platform phases, given by Fp,i, are
combined in such a way that they give the logical
expression for mission failure in phase i, Php,i. This
process is illustrated by the fault tree shown in Fig. 1
and takes into account the fact that in order for a
platform to fail in a particular phase it must not have
failed in any of the preceding phases. Thus Php,i is
given by
Php;i ¼ Fp;1  Fp;2  Fp;3     Fp;i1  Fp;i ð1Þ
The expressions given in equation (1) allow the
probability of failure during mission phase i, Qp, i, to
be found. Thus the total mission failure probability is
given by
Qp;MISS ¼
Xn
i¼1
Qp;i ð2Þ
Once the mission is in progress, updated values of the
phase failure probabilities can be calculated using a
method shown in reference [10]. Bayes’ theorem is
used to take into account the fact that k phases have
been successfully completed and Q
p;jjk, the failure of
platform p in phase j given the successful completion
of k previous phases, is given by
Q
p;jjk ¼
Qp;j
1  Pk
i¼1
Qp;i
ð3Þ
Qp,MISS is the sum of the phase failure probabilities of
the mission phases still to be completed
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Qp;MISS ¼
Xn
j¼ kþ 1
Q
p;jjk ð4Þ
In cases where the failure probabilities must be cal-
culated quickly and accurately (which will be true
when the probabilities will be used as part of a
decision-making process), fast, accurate methods of
calculation must be used.
2.2 Binary decision diagrams
A binary decision diagram (BDD) is a directed acyclic
graph which can be used to encode the failure logic
of a system exactly. It contains a number of paths
from a root vertex to terminal 0 vertices (representing
system success) and terminal 1 vertices (representing
system failure). Each path is traced along 1-branches
(to the left of vertices) and 0-branches (to the right),
and all vertices in the BDD are ordered in such a way
that the variables they represent appear in the same
order no matter which path is followed. An example
is shown in Fig. 2. Note that if terminal 0 and 1 ver-
tices are swapped then the BDD representing system
success is easily obtained from that representing
system failure. This is of particular importance when
considering the logical expressions for mission fail-
ure during a phase given by equation (1), where
success of previous phases must be considered.
When connecting two BDDs according to AND logic
the terminal 1 vertices of one of the BDDs are
replaced by the root vertex of the other BDD. When
connecting using OR logic the terminal 0 vertices are
replaced in the same way. In each case a global
ordering scheme must be followed. Hence, any vari-
ables occurring in both BDDs must be ordered
according to that ordering scheme.
A commonly used method of converting fault trees
to BDDs is given in reference [11]. The method
ensures that the specified variable ordering is fol-
lowed and is also efficient in that if nodes appear in
more than one place within the BDD structure they
are shared. Fault tree analysis relies on the assump-
tion that the basic events of the fault tree are inde-
pendent. This assumption of independence also
applies to the variables of a BDD. Hence BDDs
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Fig. 2 A fault tree and its equivalent BDD
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Fig. 1 Single-platform mission failure in phase i
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cannot deal with dependence between variables such
as standby systems or strict failure sequences.
When a multiplatform phased mission is being
conducted and decisions need to be made, whether
as part of a mission performed by autonomous
vehicles or controlled by human operators, the speed
with which the failure probability of the mission
can be provided will be of paramount importance.
BDDs provide a means to obtain the failure prob-
ability for systems quickly and accurately. When
modelling single-platform phased missions BDDs
exactly encode the failure logic expressions for pha-
ses represented in equation (1), allowing exact
quantification of the phase failure probabilities in
equation (2).
A BDD approach to phased mission analysis is
presented in reference [12] which allows the failure
expressions for Php,i (in equation (2)) to be quickly
constructed in BDD form by rapidly connecting the
BDDs for each Fp,i. This means that the quantifica-
tion process may begin soon after a mission confi-
guration is defined. An example of the approach
follows, and is illustrated in Fig. 3. It involves asso-
ciating with variables in the BDDs representing the
logical expressions for the phase failure conditions
being met, Fp,i, the time intervals over which the
variables contribute to phase failure. These time
intervals are then taken account of during the BDD
quantification process.
Here there are two fault trees representing the
logical expressions for the failure conditions of plat-
form 1 being met in phase 1, F1,1, and phase 2, F1,2, of
a mission. These are converted to BDDs using an
algorithm such as that suggested in reference [11].
Each variable of each BDD is then assigned the time
interval over which that variable can cause the
appropriate failure condition to be met. Thus when
considering F1,2, for example, if A and C occur from
time 0 to the end of the second phase the failure
conditions for phase 2 will be met. The resulting
BDDs are shown in the intermediate steps in Fig. 3,
after the phase failure fault trees and before the BDD
representing mission failure in phase 2, Ph1,2. These
BDDs now represent the failure of the platform to
complete its first and second phases. However, when
obtaining a dual BDD that represents successful
completion of a particular phase, the terminal 1s and
0s are simply swapped, since 1 represents mission
failure and 0 represents mission success. Therefore
the BDD representing mission failure in phase 2,
Ph1,2, can be constructed by swapping terminal 0 and
1 vertices of the F1,1 BDD (thus representing suc-
cessful operation through phase 1) and forming the
AND combination with the F1,2 BDD (by connecting
terminal 1 nodes of NOT F1,1 to the root node of F1,2).
Note that since the variables of F1,1 and F1,2 have dif-
ferent time intervals associated with them they are
treated as independent when BDD connection occurs
(hence no ordering scheme must be obeyed for vari-
able A). The quantification algebra deals with such
dependencies between variables when paths are
traced.
2.3 BDD quantification
Quantification of the BDDs representing mission
failure in the different phases takes place by tracing
along all paths of the BDD that lead to terminal 1
nodes and using quantification rules given in refer-
ence [12]. Consider the BDD representing mission
failure in phase 2 given in Fig. 3. This has two paths to
its single terminal 1 node, which are disjoint and
BA
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task 2, F1,2
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Fig. 3 A BDD representing failure in phase 2 of a simple mission
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represent the logical expression for the failure of
platform 1 in phase 2. The paths are shown in the
following equation, where each of the path expres-
sions is also simplified using the path rules from
reference [12]
Ph1;2 ¼ A01  B11  A02  C02þA11  A02  C02
 
¼ A01  B11  C02þA12  C02
 
ð5Þ
If a variable is traversed on its 1-branch (left) then
that variable is true and is included in the path as
such. If the variable is traversed on its 0-branch
(right) that variable is false and is included in the
path as such. Note that, for the variables considered
here
x0i ¼ xi1 ð6Þ
since if the variable does not occur in the first i
phases of the mission it must occur at some time
afterwards. Thus this representation is used when
traversing the 0-branch of a variable.
The paths are simplified using a process that is
described in detail in reference [12]. In order to
illustrate what happens in this example consider
each path in turn and look for repeated variables on
the paths. In the first path A appears twice as A01 and
A02. These variables represent respectively the
occurrence of A in the first phase and the occurrence
of A in the first phase or the second phase. For each of
these to be true Amust fail in the first phase. Thus the
variables representing A reduce to A01. In general
xi1j1  xi2j2 ¼ x½maxði1;i2Þ½minðj1;j2Þ ð7Þ
If, for a general variable xij, i> j then xij¼ 0. Further
details can be found in reference [12]. Once the paths
have been determined and their logic simplified the
probability of occurrence can be determined for each
of them. The path probabilities are added to give the
total probability. When doing this the probability for
each variable is determined using
PðxijÞ ¼
Z tj
ti
fxðtÞdt ð8Þ
where fx(t) is the failure probability density function
for the component represented by variable x.
3 MULTIPLATFORM PHASED MISSION
METHODOLOGY
Presented above was an overview of a method for
quantifying the probability of phase failure for single
platforms performing a phased mission. This section
presents a methodology for analysing the failure
probability of multiplatform phased missions. Firstly,
a technique for calculating phase and mission failure
probabilities before a mission begins, i.e. initial fail-
ure probabilities, is presented. Next, a technique for
calculating updated failure probabilities, calculated
once the mission is in progress, is presented. These
updated failure probabilities are calculated taking
into account any information that is currently known
about the mission progress, which could, for exam-
ple, come from a diagnostics tool. Different cases are
considered for this information, and then the time at
which this information becomes available is con-
sidered.
3.1 Definitions
Consider a multiplatform phased mission being
conducted by n platforms, each of which is per-
forming its own phased mission, part of which is a
task or tasks that contribute to achieving the overall
mission objective. Assume that the platforms are
considered to be in a fully working state when they
begin their own phased mission (which may or may
not begin as the entire mission begins) and that all of
the platforms are non-repairable over the mission
duration. Given that each platform performs a num-
ber of phases as part of its own phased mission and
that the phases of different platforms do not neces-
sarily begin and end simultaneously, it is possible to
identify a number of distinct mission phases, m. The
start and end times of these mission phases will
coincide with each distinct point in time at which
platform phases begin and end. Thus the minimum
number of mission phases, m, is the number of
phases carried out by the platform which performs
the greatest number of phases. The maximum value
will be the sum of the number of phases in all of the
individual platform missions.
As already described for single-platform phased
missions, a platform will successfully complete its
phased mission only if it completes every single
phase of that mission successfully. When a number of
platforms work together to achieve a common
objective only certain phases that are performed by
the individual platforms will contribute to the overall
success of the mission. For example, if reconnais-
sance performed by an unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) is crucial to the success of a multiplatform
phased mission then it might not be imperative that
the UAV is successfully recovered after its recon-
naissance phase has been performed. It could, how-
ever, also be the case that each of the platforms
involved in the multiplatform phased mission has to
successfully complete all of its own phases in order
for the mission to be successful. For example, the
return to base of the UAVmight be considered crucial
to the overall success of the mission. In general, the
importance of each of the individual platforms
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completing their own phased mission as part of the
multiplatform mission will depend upon the mission
being performed.
Each of the platforms taking part in the multiplat-
form phased mission will have certain functions and
subsystems that are unique to them. However, there
could also be functions and subsystems that are used
by more than one platform and hence introduce
dependencies between the platforms. This should
come as no surprise since the platforms are not
working independently to achieve the overall mission
objective. A dependency between platforms could,
for example, be introduced by a shared communica-
tion system.
A simple example of a multiplatform phased mis-
sion is introduced in Fig. 4. Here, two platforms,
1 and 2, are each required to perform two tasks,
which contribute to the overall mission. The first task
is to reach a meeting point; the second is to each
perform a task at that meeting point. Each platform
then goes on to perform a third phase, which does
not contribute to the overall mission. If the phased
missions were to be analysed for the individual
platforms these phases would be taken account of.
However, they will not be taken account of when
determining the successful achievement of the over-
all mission objective. Due to the platform capabilities
and initial locations the journey to the meeting point
takes longer for platform 1 than for platform 2. Thus,
as can be seen from the diagram, there are distinct
phases in achieving the overall mission objective:
1. Platform 1 begins the journey to the meeting
point.
2. Platform 1 continues towards the meeting point
and platform 2 starts its journey to the meeting
point.
3. Both platforms perform the tasks in their second
phases together.
The phase failure logic expressions for platform 1
are those given in the BDDs included in the simple
example in Fig. 3, and the phase failure logic expres-
sion BDDs for platform 2 are shown in Fig. 5. Note
that the failure logic expression BDDs are not given
for the third platform phases since these do not con-
tribute to the overall mission objective that is being
analysed here. It should also be noted that the failure
of platform 2 in its second phase depends on the
occurrence of C. This represents a dependency
between the platforms, since the failure of platform 1
in its own second phase also depends on C. In reality,
such a dependency could come from a shared com-
munication link, for example.
Initial and updated failure probabilities can be
calculated for the individual platforms using the
methods discussed in section 2.1. For the whole
mission, the methods to be used are detailed in the
following sections. The assumptions specific to the
case of multiple platforms are as follows:
1. In order for the mission to fail in any phase it
must have successfully completed all previous
mission phases.
2. Each platform in a multiplatform phased mission
is considered to be fully functional at the start of
its own mission. The only exception to this is
when failure events are shared by platforms (i.e.
dependencies exist between platforms). In this
case it is assumed that the event may occur from
the time when the first platform that is depen-
dent upon that event starts its own mission.
3. Mission failure in any particular mission phase
is defined to occur when at least one of the
individual platforms performing in that phase
fails to complete that phase. (Any redundancy
whereby other platforms could perform the task
required of the failing platform is assumed to
entail the employment of a different mission
configuration.)
Note that in reality multiplatform phased missions
are likely to be very complex, featuring a greater
number of platforms, each of which is required
to perform more phases that contribute to the
overall mission. The example given is purely to
demonstrate the concepts of multiplatform phased
mission analysis.
1,1Platform 1
Platform 2
Mission
1,2
2,22,1
1 32
1,3
2,3
Fig. 4 A simple multiplatform phased mission representation
D
1
E 0
0
D
1
C 0
0
Fig. 5 The BDDs for the failure conditions of platform 2 in
its first phase (left) and second phase (right)
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3.2 Calculating initial probabilities
Let Fi represent the logical expression for the failure
conditions for the entire mission being met in mis-
sion phase i and let Phi represent the logical expres-
sion for mission failure in mission phase i. Then
Phi ¼ F1  F2  F3      Fi1  Fi ð9Þ
This is in accordance with the assumption that in
order for the mission to fail in mission phase i all of
the mission phases from 1 to i 1 must have been
completed successfully. For the mission failure con-
ditions to be met in mission phase i at least one of the
platforms that are taking part in the mission must fail
in that phase. Therefore
Fi ¼ F1;i þ F2;i þ    þ Fn;i ð10Þ
where þ represents the Boolean OR operator and n is
the number of platforms involved in the mission.
Substituting equation (10) into equation (9) gives the
logical expression for mission failure in phase i in
terms of the logical expressions for the failure con-
ditions of the individual platforms being met
Phi ¼ F1;1  F1;2  F1;3      F1;i 1
 F2;1  F2;2  F2;3      F2;i1
..
.
 Fn;1  Fn;2  Fn;3      Fn;i 1
 F1;i þ F2;i þ    þ Fn;i
 
ð11Þ
Note that since it is not necessarily the case that all
platforms are active throughout the entire mission, it
could be that some of these Fp,i’s could be set to zero.
For example, if platform 1 only began its own phased
mission in mission phase 4 of the overall mission,
then F1,1, F1,2, and F1,3 would be set to zero. A similar
case holds if a platform finishes its mission when
there are still further mission phases to be conducted.
For example, if platform 1 finishes its own phased
mission in the overall mission phase 10 and equation
(11) is constructed for i¼ 12, then F1,11 and F1,12 must
be set to zero. This is, of course, also the case when
later platform phases do not contribute to mission
success.
Finding the mission phase failure probabilities, Qi,
is carried out using the logical expressions formed
using equation (11). These phase failure probabilities
are then added to give the total failure probability for
the entire mission, QMISS
QMISS ¼
Xm
i¼ 1
Qi ð12Þ
For the two-platform missions shown in Fig. 4 the
BDDs representing the logical expressions for the
mission phase failure probabilities given in equation
(11) can be constructed as shown in Fig. 6. The parts
of the BDD representing the logic for the different
platform mission phase failure conditions are
marked with dashed lines. Note how, for the BDDs
representing platform 2, i.e. F2,2 and F2,3, the allo-
cated time intervals for the variables start at 1 rather
than 0 (as is the case for platform 1), since platform 2
starts its own phased mission as mission phase 1
ends, not at the start of the mission. Note also that,
for the same reason, F2,1 is set to zero since platform
2 is not yet active in mission phase 1. It should also be
noted that, when considering F2,3, the variable C is
allocated the time interval (0, 3) rather than (1, 3), in
accordance with the assumption that shared events
are considered able to fail from the start of the plat-
form starting first of all with the platforms sharing the
variable.
However, it is better to construct the BDDs repre-
senting mission phase failure by taking into account
the platform phases wherever possible, since this will
reduce the size of the phase failure BDDs. To illus-
trate this consider the BDD for Ph3 in Fig. 6. Since
platform 1 is performing its own first phase over
mission phases 1 and 2, this can be represented by a
single BDD, which is equivalent to
F1;1  F1;2 ð13Þ
Figure 7 shows the result of this. Performing this
simple process wherever possible will help to mini-
mize the size of the BDDs representing Phi. For
example, the BDD representing Ph3 in Fig. 7 has two
fewer nodes than that in Fig. 6 (8 as opposed to 10)
and half as many 1-terminating paths (12 as opposed
to 24). This will have a positive effect on the quanti-
fication time.
The paths of the BDDs can then be determined and
simplified. The resultant logic for the mission failure
in phases 1, 2, and 3 is given in the following equa-
tions respectively, showing that these expressions
can be quantified as demonstrated earlier to give the
mission phase failure probabilities
Ph1 ¼ A01  B01 ð14Þ
Ph2 ¼
A01  B11  A02  B02þA01  B11  A02  B21 D12  E12
þA01  B11  A21 D12  E12
þA11  A02  B02
þA11  A02  B21 D12  E12
þA11  A21 D12  E12
2
666664
3
777775
¼
A01  B12þA01  B21 D12  E12
þ 0
þA12  B02
þA12  B21 D12  E12
þA21 D12  E12
2
666664
3
777775
ð15Þ
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Ph3 ¼
A02  B21 D12  E21  A03  C03
þA02  B21 D12  E21  A03  C31 D13  C03
þA02  B21 D12  E21  A31 D13  C03
þA02  B21 D21  A03  C03
þA02  B21 D21  A03  C31 D13  C03
þA02  B21 D21  A31 D13  C03
þA21 D12  E21  A03  C03
þA21 D12  E21  A03  C31 D13  C03
þA21 D12  E21  A31 D13  C03
þA21 D21  A03  C03
þA21 D21  A03  C31 D13  C03
þA21 D21  A31 D13  C03
2
6666666666666666664
3
7777777777777777775
¼
A02  B21  C03 D12  E21
þ 0
þ 0
þA02  B21  C03 D21
þ 0
þ 0
þA23  C03 D12  E21
þ 0
þA31  C03 D12  E21
þA23  C03 D21
þ 0
þA31  C03 D23
2
6666666666666666664
3
7777777777777777775
ð16Þ
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Fig. 6 The BDDs representing mission phase failure for each of the three mission phases of the example
mission
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3.3 Calculating updated probabilities
Once a mission is underway and several phases are
successfully completed, the probability of mission
failure for remaining mission phases can be calcu-
lated in order to give an updated measure of the
mission failure probability. In such cases it is neces-
sary to take into account that a certain portion of the
mission will have been successfully completed in
order to reach the point at which the updated prob-
abilities are required. Bayes’ theorem of conditional
probability states that the probability of A occurring
given that an event B has occurred is given as follows
P AjBð Þ ¼ P A  Bð Þ
P Bð Þ ð17Þ
This expression can be used to find the probability of
failure in a certain mission phase given that a num-
ber of mission phases have been successfully com-
pleted. The probability of mission failure in mission
phase j given the successful completion of k phases is
thus given by
Q
jjk ¼
P Phj  Ph1  Ph2      Phk
 
P Ph1  Ph2      Phk
 
¼ P Phj
 
1  P Ph1 þ Ph2 þ    þ Phkð Þ
ð18Þ
Since the mission phases are mutually exclusive this
is equivalent to
Q
jjk ¼
Qj
1  Pk
i¼ 1
Qi
ð19Þ
These mission phase failure probabilities given k
successfully completed mission phases can now be
added to give the total probability of mission failure
given k successfully completed mission phases
Q
MISSjk ¼
Xm
j¼ kþ 1
Q
jjk ð20Þ
For the two-platform example multiplatform phased
missions the failure probabilities obtained when
quantifying the BDDs given in Fig. 6 would be sub-
stituted into equation (19) in order to calculate these
updated probabilities.
3.4 Including diagnostics information
The updated failure probabilities given in section 3.3
are calculated taking into account the mission phases
completed. However, no account is taken of the
change in status of any parts of the platforms that are
performing the multiplatform phased mission. It is
likely that, as the mission progresses, information
will become available about certain parts of the sys-
tems involved. For example, a diagnostics device
might report that a component of a system failed at a
specified time or that a function was known to be
successful at a certain time. It is clearly important to
take account of this kind of information.
3.4.1 Taking account of subsystem status
Assume that there is a subsystem, S, which is
required by one or more of the platforms taking part
in the multiplatform phased mission, and that the
subsystem will be considered to have failed at the
point that the diagnostics device reports the failure of
S. It is possible that S could be used to perform dif-
ferent functions in different mission phases. How-
ever, if S is reported to have failed in a particular
configuration, then it is assumed that S has not failed
in that configuration at an earlier time. Let the logical
expression for subsystem S failure in a particular
configuration in mission phase i be represented by
FS,i. Since it has not failed in that configuration at an
earlier time that failure configuration must not have
occurred earlier in the mission, i.e. in the previous
i 1 phases. Therefore the logical expression for the
failure of subsystem S in phase i is given by con-
sidering its successful operation through previous
phases and failure in mission phase i as follows
PhS;i ¼ FS;1  FS;2  FS;3      FS;i1  FS;i ð21Þ
Assume that subsystem S is known to have failed
after the completion of rmission phases and that the
mission then continues. After k (k> r) mission phases
have been successfully completed, Bayes’ theorem
(equation (17)) can be used to give an expression for
the failure probability of mission phase j given the
D13
0
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0
B02
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0
E12
2,11,1 FF ⋅
2,2F
3,1F
3,2F
C03
A03
1
C03
1 0
Fig. 7 BDD representing mission phase 3 failure when
calculating initial mission failure probabilities
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successful completion of k mission phases and sub-
system S failure after r mission phases
Q
jjk:S;r ¼ P the mission fails in phase j
phases 1to k were successfully completed
AND
subsystem S failed in phase r

0
B@
1
CA
¼ P Phj Ph1  Ph2      Phk  PhS;r
 
¼
P Phj  Ph1  Ph2      Phk  PhS;r
 
P Ph1  Ph2      Phk  PhS;r
  ð22Þ
This does not simplify to give an equation of the form
of that in equation (20), since the terms representing
mission phase failure in phases are not mutually
exclusive from the terms representing subsystem
failure in mission phases. However, equation (22) can
be reduced to
Q
jjk:S;r ¼
P Phj  PhS;r
 
P F1  F2      Fk  PhS;r
  ð23Þ
Using equations (10), (11), and (21), the logical
expressions for which failure probabilities must be
calculated can be converted to a form wherein all
single terms are logical expressions for the failure
conditions of the platforms being met in each of the
mission phases, Fp,i, and for the subsystem S failure
conditions being met in each of the mission phases,
FS,i. The BDDs representing these expressions can
then be constructed using the BDDs for Fp,i and FS,i,
as shown in section 2.2, and quantified to give the
updated phase failure probabilities. In order to find
the total failure probability given that k mission
phases have been successfully completed and sub-
system S failed after r mission phases, the phase
failure probabilities are added over the remaining
phases
Q
MISSjk:S;r ¼
Xm
j¼ kþ 1
Q
jjk:S;r ð24Þ
If the subsystem S was instead known to have worked
for a certain number of phases then this information
could be included in a similar way in order to calcu-
late updated failure probabilities. In this case the
probability of failure in mission phase j, given that k
phases have been successfully completed and sub-
system S is known to have functioned successfully for
r phases, is given by
Q
jjk:S;r ¼
P Phj  FS;1  FS;2      FS;r
 
P F1  F2      Fk  FS;1  FS;2      FS;r
 
ð25Þ
The expressions given in equations (23) and (25) are
constructed using the platform phase failure logic
BDDs and the subsystem phase failure logic BDDs in
a similar way to that demonstrated when calculating
the initial failure probabilities.
3.4.2 Taking account of the latest component
failure data
When a subsystem S failure occurs, as described in
the previous section, a diagnostics system could take
into account the fault symptoms reported and use
these to provide information as to which system
components caused the failure. Even if it is not pos-
sible to determine exactly which components caused
S to fail, evidence of the fault symptoms can be uti-
lized to deduce the failure probability of those com-
ponents with the potential to have failed. There will
be two possibilities for such components:
1. A new failure probability density function is
provided by the diagnostics system, giving the
probability that the component will fail after the
time of the diagnosis.
2. The diagnostics system provides a certain prob-
ability of the component being in a failed state at
the time of the diagnosis.
This information is then used along with the fact
that the subsystem has failed (as shown in the pre-
vious section) in order to quantify the failure prob-
ability over the remainder of the mission. This is
done by taking into account new quantification rules
for components when calculating path probabilities
in the mission phase BDDs. Both of these cases are
now discussed below.
Case 1
If the information is provided from a diagnostics tool
at time td then there will be a new failure probability
density function for component x after time td given
by fx,d(t). In this case path simplification takes place
as in section 2.3. However, when finding the prob-
ability of path occurrence, equation (8) is no longer
used to calculate the probabilities for variables on the
path whose failure probability density function has
been updated. Instead, the following equation is
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used, where, for any probability before td, the original
failure density function fx(t) is used, and after td the
new density function fx,d(t) is used
P xij
  ¼
R tj
ti
fx tð Þdt; ti < td; tj6 tdR td
ti
fx tð Þdt þ
R tj
td
fx;d tð Þdt; ti < td; tj > tdR tj
ti
fx;d tð Þdt; ti>td
8>><
>>:
ð26Þ
Case 2
For Case 2, the output of the diagnostics tool for the
components is a probability qx,d, which is indepen-
dent of time. Now, owing to the evidence of the sub-
system failure, the component is believed to have
failed with a constant probability. Thus, at any time
during the mission, the probability that the compo-
nent has failed is qx,d. Also, after the time of the
diagnosis event, td, the component is now considered
to remain in the same state that it was in immediately
before td, since no new failure distribution is avail-
able unless new information is reported by the diag-
nostics tool. The quantification process takes this
information into account using the following equa-
tion instead of equation (8) for relevant components
P xij
  ¼ qx;d; tj6 td1  qx;d; ti6 td; tj ¼ 1
0; otherwise
8<
: ð27Þ
Quantification. If updated component failure prob-
abilities are provided by a diagnostics system then
they must be taken into account during the quantifi-
cation. If the component failure data supplied is in the
form of failure probability distributions (Case 1), then
once the updated phase failure probabilities are cal-
culated for the remaining phases of the mission these
updated failure probabilities may be added to give the
total mission failure probability as in equation (20).
However, if the component failure data supplied are in
terms of a probability of the component being in a
failed state (Case 2), then the phase failure prob-
abilities cannot be added to give the total mission
failure probability since the component failure prob-
ability contribution to the specific mission phases
cannot be ascertained. In this case logical expressions
must be constructed and analysed separately for each
mission phase and the mission as a whole.
3.4.3 Taking account of the exact time of
diagnostics information
As considered so far, the updated failure probabilities
are calculated assuming that the time at which the
diagnostics information becomes available is a point
between mission phases, as one ends and another
starts. It is likely that the phase and mission failure
probabilities will be required from some time during
a mission phase. If diagnostics information comes to
light during a mission phase it is possible to calculate
the failure probability for the remainder of the phase
given the information known up to this time. For
situations such as this, the mission can be split at the
point where the information becomes available, and
the updated mission phase failure probabilities are
calculated using the expressions derived earlier,
given that the mission was successful for previous
mission phases.
4 EXAMPLE ANALYSIS
In order to illustrate the BDD analysis techniques
for multiplatform phased missions consider again
the two-platform phased mission described earlier.
Assume that there is a subsystem S in this mission
whose failure will be reported by a diagnostics tool
and that S is made up simply of component A. This is
a simplistic example for demonstration purposes
here and in reality it is unlikely that a subsystem will
be made up of a single component. However, the
methodology works in just the same way.
Consider that the mission is in progress and that
a fault is diagnosed in mission phase 2, as shown in
Fig. 8, where the time of the diagnosis is illustrated by
the thick dashed line. New updated mission failure
probabilities are required at this point in order to
predict the failure probability for the remainder of
the mission. As described earlier, when taking into
account the exact time of diagnostics information,
the mission phase in which the diagnosis is made is
split. Thus, for this example, mission phase 2 is split,
giving new mission phase x, which is the completed
part of mission phase 2, and y, which is the part of
mission phase 2 still to be completed. Mission phases
x and y are also shown in Fig. 8.
Now the updated mission failure probabilities can
be calculated using equation (23), given that mission
phases 1 and x have been successfully completed and
1,1Platform 1
Platform 2
Mission
1,2
2,22,1
1 32
Fault reported here ⇒ split mission phase 2 to give:
New Mission y1 3x
Fig. 8 Splitting a mission phase at the time of a diagnostics
report
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that subsystem S worked successfully through phases
1 but failed in phase x. Using equation (23) gives
Qyjx:S;x ¼ P the mission fails in phase y
phases 1 and x were successfully completed
AND
subsystem S failed in phase x

0
B@
1
CA
¼
P

Phy  PhS;x

P

F1  Fx  PhS;x

¼
P

F1;1  F1;x  F2;x  F1;y þ F2;y
   FS;1  FS;x

P

F1;1  F1;x  F2;x  FS;1  FS;x
 ð28Þ
and
Q3jx:S;x ¼ P the mission fails in phase 3
phases 1 and x were successfully completed
AND
subsystem S failed in phase x

0
B@
1
CA
¼
P

Ph3  PhS;x

P

F1  Fx  PhS;x

¼
P

F1;1  F1;x  F1;y  F2;x  F2;y  F1;3 þ F2;3
   FS;1  FS;x

P

F1;1  F1;x  F2;x  FS;1  FS;x
 ð29Þ
Equations (28) and (29) share a denominator, the
BDD for which is shown in Fig. 9. Note that when
constructing this BDD its size is minimized by taking
account of the mission phases that form complete or
partial platform phases. Phase 1 for platform 1 actu-
ally takes place over mission phases 1, x, and y, and
therefore this fact is taken into account when con-
structing the BDD. The portions of the BDD in Fig. 9
representing platform 1 failure in mission phase 1 and
mission phase x are hence denoted by a single BDD.
Figure 10 shows the BDDs for the logical expres-
sions in the numerators of equations (28) and (29).
Note again how the size of the BDDs has been kept to
a minimum by taking account of consecutive mission
phases that make up part of a single-platform phase
when considering the logical expressions for mission
phase failure and combining BDDs accordingly.
These BDDs are quantified as before.
5 CONCLUSIONS
A methodology for quantifying phase and mission
failure probabilities for multiplatform phased mis-
sion systems has been presented. It has character-
istics that make it suitable for use in a decision-
making strategy for missions involving multiplatform
collaboration. The methodology allows:
1. Rapid connection of BDDs representing plat-
form failure in mission phases, to give BDDs
representing mission failure in those phases as
soon as new or alternative mission configur-
ations become known. This means that quanti-
fication may begin relatively soon after a mission
configuration is proposed.
2. The calculation of initial failure probabilities
before a mission begins and updated failure
probabilities once a mission is in progress.
3. The use of initial mission phase failure prob-
abilities to calculate the updated mission phase
failure probabilities when no further information
is known about the system.
4. The calculation of updated mission failure
probabilities when diagnostics information such
A0x
0
B0x
D1x
0
E1x
xFF ,11,1 ⋅
xF ,2
A01
0
1,SF
A0x
01
xSF ,
Fig. 9 The BDD representing the denominator of equa-
tions (28) and (29)
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as a fault or other change in the mission envir-
onment becomes known. The cases of subsystem
success and failure are covered.
5. The use of further diagnostics information
regarding updated component failure data when
calculating updated failure probabilities.
6. Theexact timeofdiagnostics events tobeconsidered
when calculating updated failure probabilities.
Since BDDs offer a rapid reliability evaluation
capability they form the basis of the methodology.
This provides the greatest opportunity to develop a
method capable of providing real-time decisions for
fast decision making.
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Fig. 10 The BDDs representing the numerators of equations (28) (left) and (29) (right)
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